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My own ideal was […]: to say complicated things 
as simply and clearly as possible.
Raymond Boudon.
1. Raymond Boudon, a giant of the social sciences 
On 10 April 2014, Raymond Boudon – one of the most prominent social 
theorists in the second half of the 20th century and the first part of the 21st 
– died in Paris. His death marked an enormous loss for the social sciences in 
general and for sociology in particular.
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With many of his works already authentic classics of the social sciences, 
Boudon’s oeuvre is immense, covering fields as diverse as the sociology of 
education and social mobility, social theory, methodology, the analysis of clas-
sics of these disciplines, ideologies, beliefs and moral values, political theory, 
rationality, and a long etcetera. Obviously, this introduction is not the place 
to discuss his work as a whole, or even superficially, so I will focus on a few 
contributions which, from my point of view, are among his most important 
and share a thread which I will refer to later.
2. Methodological individualism and social mechanisms 
First of all, one of Raymond Boudon’s most important contributions to social 
sciences was his defence of methodological individualism and of causal explana-
tions based on social mechanisms (also called causal or generative mechanisms). 
That is to say, the principle according to which any macro-social phenomena 
must be explained as a result of individuals’ behaviour, which in turn is the 
result of these individuals’ reasons and motivations. Also in turn, these reasons 
and motivations can only be understood in reference to the initial social situ-
ation of these individuals.
Despite that, as the author himself stated (see his paper in this issue), this 
is an old idea, Raymond Boudon (together with other very prominent social 
theorists such as Thomas Fararo, James Coleman or Jon Elster) made a decisive 
contribution to making this principle the basis of what constitutes an appro-
priate explanatory strategy in social science. Boudon developed this strategy 
in opposition to pseudo-explanations, both functionalist or structuralist ones as 
well as exclusively statistical ones, whose paradigmatic example was positivism 
(see Cherkaoui in this issue).
It is necessary to clarify this point somewhat in order to avoid misunder-
standings. Boudon was always a promoter of empirical sociology and a staunch 
defender of using statistical tools and formal models. However, he was critical 
to the same extent of what has been called variable sociology (Esser, 1996), that 
is to say, the approach by which a phenomenon is explained when we identify 
a set of independent variables that predict the variance of dependent variables. 
3.  The scientific nature of social sciences and the study of educational 
inequalities
For Raymond Boudon, the purpose of sociology (and of social science in gen-
eral) should not be to move the reader or to make him/her enjoy (as literature 
can do), nor to transform society through political activism, or even to produce 
data and analyses aimed at making decisions. As he masterly maintained in his 
“Sociology that really matters” (2001), the main purpose of sociology must be 
causal explanation of enigmatic social phenomena. From this point of view, 
sociology has a scientific nature and must be ruled by the same principles of 
formal and methodological accuracy like in any other discipline.
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L’inégalité des chances (1973) constituted the first of Raymond Boudon’s 
major work and what finally placed him in the foreground of the international 
scene. In this work, which today is an unavoidable starting point for the best 
contemporary research on social and educational inequalities, the Frenchman 
put into practice the principles of his social science to show how agents’ deci-
sions at the micro level, given their different starting points, result in differenti-
ated scholarly careers and reproduce existing inequalities. In this way, Boudon 
was successful in showing how actions and interactions at the micro-level can 
produce aggregated outcomes at the macro-level that nobody expects or wishes 
(perverse effects) without resorting to obscure teleological arguments or employ-
ing mere descriptive labels such as “socialization” with explanatory aims (see 
León in this issue).
The explanation offered by Boudon contrasted with the pseudo-explanation 
in fashion at the time (and still today) of Bourdieu and Passeron (1970), for 
whom school is, in reality, a tool for the reproduction of social inequalities. 
Boudon himself described Bourdieu and Passeron’s work as rhetorical, pedan-
tic and nebulous (see his paper in this issue) because the fact is that Boudon’s 
work is at the other extreme of the bullshit, so sadly habitual in some contem-
porary intellectual circles.1 As Jean Cazeneuve stated in the speech he gave 
upon Boudon’s election to the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques (see 
Boudon in this issue), Boudon’s style was the opposite: to say complicated 
things as simply and clearly as possible.
4.  Ordinary rationality vs. rational choice theory and explanations with 
black boxes
Another of Raymond Boudon’s major contributions was his ordinary ration-
ality theory (also known as cognitive or subjective). The Frenchman showed 
himself to be lucidly critical of rational choice theory and, among other things, 
pointed out that human beings do not always act in an instrumental way, so 
this theory can only explain a more or less restricted part of human behaviour 
(especially if the universal self-interest principle is assumed). In spite of its lim-
ited explanatory power, however, Boudon still recognized the methodological 
goodness of rational choice theory. Explanations based on this theory are final, 
without black boxes. When we can show that somebody has done something 
because it was in his/her interest, this person’s behaviour becomes understand-
able for us, we do not have additional questions.
In this sense, explanations based on rational choice theory are better than 
employing (so habitual in the social sciences) mere descriptive labels such as 
“socialization”, “enculturation”, “habitus”, etc. with explanatory aims. According 
to the Frenchman, when we say that somebody has done X because he/she has 
been socialized to do X, in reality we are not explaining his/her behaviour, we are 
just using a technical label to name a phenomenon whose workings we ignore.
1. On the concept of bullshit, see Cohen (2002).
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So, according to Boudon, we need a theory with the methodological power 
of rational choice theory (which avoids black boxes in the explanations) but 
which increases its explanatory capacity. This theory is, according to Boudon, 
ordinary rationality theory. Boudon argued that, in principle, we must assume 
that, in a specific cognitive context, individuals always have good reasons to do 
what they do or to believe what they believe. These reasons can be instrumental 
as well as cognitive or axiological. In this way, Boudon solved, for example, 
the well-known problem (for rational choice theory) of why most people vote 
in elections when going to vote has costs for individuals and they know that 
the effect of their vote on the outcome will be almost null. According to the 
Frenchman, people vote when they believe that democracy is something valu-
able (cognitive reason), that they must contribute to preserve it (axiological 
reason), and that one party is better than the others to govern (cognitive reason). 
Again, Boudon solved the problem without having to turn to black-box pseudo-
explanations such as people vote because they have been socialized to vote.
5. Anti-relativism
Finally, the last of Raymond Boudon’s contributions to the social sciences I 
would like to refer to in this introduction is his critique against constructiv-
ism or relativism, not only against epistemic relativism, but also against moral 
or political relativism, though here I will exclusively focus on the first one. 
In spite of the fact that this topic is clearly implicit in what I have dealt with 
above, Boudon dedicated some major works (i.e. The poverty of relativism) to 
discuss it in detail. The Frenchman denounced the thesis of the avant-garde 
of the sociology of science according to which social-scientific knowledge, 
like any other form of knowledge or discourse, is relative to its social, cultural 
or historical context of production (Berger), is the product of some kind of 
interests of power (Foucault), or constitutes an exercise of “symbolic violence” 
(Bourdieu), so that the objective knowledge pursued by social sciences with 
a scientific vocation is impossible. Among many other problems, this kind 
of arguments are inconsistent and self-nullifying. Note that when somebody 
argues that any discourse constitutes, for example, a discourse of power and 
that for this reason its validity claims cannot be accepted, we can immediately 
ask why we should accept the validity claims of his/her argument if it is just a 
discourse of power whose validity claims cannot be accepted. That is to say, 
our interlocutor asks us to accept his/her reasons of why there are no reasons, 
just power exercises (Noguera, 2006a). 
6. Raymond Boudon, an inspirer of analytical sociological theory 
The contributions and characteristics of Raymond Boudon’s social science to 
which I have made reference (as well as many others discussed in the papers of 
this issue) constitute some of the central components of what has been called 
analytical sociological (or social) theory (AST). 
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AST should not be understood as the thousandth school or “paradigm” 
in social sciences. It constitutes, rather, an attempt, where several theories, 
methodologies, positions and social research traditions converge, to establish 
reasonable “rules of the game” in social sciences: to reorder and clarify the 
nature of the contributions of sociology with the aim of making it a rigorous 
scientific discipline that provides empirically grounded explanations of relevant 
social phenomena2 (Noguera and Tena-Sánchez, 2013). Clearly, Raymond 
Boudon, together with many other social scientists and philosophers, has been 
one of the main inspirers of this movement.
7. Short comment of the papers in this issue
“Why I became a sociologist” is an autobiographic text published in 2009 
where Raymond Boudon reviews his career, from his beginnings as a student 
at the École Normale Supérieure to the last phase of his trajectory. Boudon 
describes what were his main intellectual influences and interests throughout 
his life and how these were embodied in his works. The text has the virtue of 
offering a summary of Boudon’s work written by the author himself.  
Mohamed Cherkaoui’s paper sets Boudon’s proposal against empiricist 
approaches, whose most prominent expression was positivism. Cherkaoui makes 
clear the weak spots of this approach, as well as how the Boudonian strategy of 
generative mechanisms contributes to overcoming them. In this way, the paper 
contributes to answering the usual criticism which brands authors such as Ray-
mond Boudon (and AST in general) as positivists (as if this accusation – were it 
true – would automatically disqualify an entire approach).  
Ángeles Lizón, on the other hand, offers a retrospective of Boudon’s aca-
demic contribution through the three major stages of his academic career (path 
regression models, game theoretical mechanisms and ordinary rationality). In 
this sense, like Cherkaoui, Lizón’s paper also helps to understand how the gen-
erative mechanisms approach constituted, among other things, an overcoming 
of the previous atheoretical empiricist approaches and to refute the hasty criti-
cism of positivism against Raymond Boudon’s approach (and AST in general). 
In the last part of the paper, Lizón criticizes Boudon’s conception of meth-
odological individualism because, according to her, he is not clear enough about 
the ontological assumptions underlying this explanatory principle.
Karl-Dieter Opp criticizes what he considers a major problem of Raymond 
Boudon’s rationality theory: its relatively low explanatory power (given that Bou-
don does not establish a criteria to select the causally relevant reasons for an 
explanandum). Opp inquires into the validity of the theory, that is, if it is plausible 
that a single theory can explain the wide range of phenomena Boudon focuses on. 
On the other hand, Opp criticizes the fact that Boudon rejects the utility 
maximization principle and makes a powerful defence of it as well as of rational 
2. For a deeper explanation of AST, see Demeulenaere (2011), Hedström (2005), Hedström 
& Bearman (2009), Manzo (2010, 2014) or Noguera (2006b, 2010).
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choice theory, arguing that, in fact, Boudon’s theory is compatible with a wide 
version of rational choice theory and can be understood in this way.
Pierre Demeulenaere’s paper focuses on Boudon’s ordinary rationality theory. 
First of all, he presents the general theories of rationality that currently exist in 
social sciences. According to the author, rationality has been understood histori-
cally as 1) intentionality (in the weak sense that people have reasons to do what 
they do), 2) preference consistency, 3) adequacy of the choice of the means to 
reach an end, and 4) self-interest. Demeulenaere argues that, in spite of the fact 
that, in practice, these four criteria (or some of them) are usually found together 
in the concepts of rationality that social scientists use in their work, they are in 
fact four analytically distinguishable concepts of rationality. According to the 
author, Boudon’s ordinary rationality theory has some major advantages with 
respect to previous theories, but Demeleneure states that it can be enhanced 
and completed in several dimensions in order to achieve a sound theory of the 
interpretation of human actions in the social world. In this regard, he points to 
the need to find a general basis for defining something as rational. 
Gianluca Manzo’s paper deals with several topics related to Boudon’s work. 
First of all, Manzo argues that because Bourdon’s ordinary rationality theory 
broadens the concept of rationality of rational choice theory, it loses its predic-
tive capacity.
In this sense, he points out that, to recuperate it, it is necessary to identify 
reason trigger factors, that is to say, mechanisms that systematically tend to 
trigger certain sets of reasons. In this way, we would have access to a set of 
regularities that enable us to formulate ex-ante facto clear expectations on what 
micro- and macro-level outcomes are more likely to be observed. Next, Manzo 
discusses three kinds of factors which, according to him, are good candidates 
to progress in that direction: social-identity, emotions and heuristics.3
In the second part of the paper, Manzo discusses Boudon’s point of view on 
AST.4 Manzo shows that AST places the methodological principles defended 
by Boudon explicitly, consciously and programmatically at the core of the 
approach. In fact, it could not be any other way given that, as said previously, 
Boudon is one of the main inspiring intellectual sources of the analytical sociol-
ogy movement. Finally, Gianluca Manzo discusses the potential of an innova-
tive type of formal models for AST: agent-based models (ABM).
Precisely, Francisco Linares’ paper shows one of the main utilities of ABM, 
its potential as a formal tool to test the plausibility of the assumptions of a 
theory. Linares builds a model where he explores the role of homophily and 
social contagion in the search for a partner. Linares argues that his exercise 
illustrates, in practice, Boudon’s proposals, as he formulated them in works 
such as La logique du social. Besides its intrinsic quality, the exercise is interest-
3. Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts adopted by actors when they have to decide and solve 
problems. Specifically, Manzo make reference to Gigerenzer’s fast and frugal heuristics theory 
(2008).
4. See Boudon (2012b).
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ing because Boudon (2012b) referred indirectly to ABM as “secondary techni-
cal details”. In this sense, Manzo and Linares’ papers complement one another 
in showing that ABM is not a secondary detail but a fundamental tool for the 
advance of AST as well as a good instrument to put in practice the methodo-
logical principles defended by Raymond Boudon himself.
Fernando Aguiar starts by asking about the possible reasons Boudon did 
not develop a theory on social identity or pay special attention to the concept. 
Boudon himself answered this question in part when, as Aguiar states, he 
explicitly rejected the concept of identity which he saw as a product of a hyper-
socialized portrayal of the actor. However, as Aguiar argues, it does not neces-
sarily derive from Boudon’s criticism that social identity is not an important 
factor for explaining social behaviour, but that, again, it is usually employed as 
a mere label without explanatory value. In his paper, Fernando Aguiar offers an 
interesting avenue to overcome this problem, that is, by employing Boudon’s 
ordinary rationality theory to build a concept of social identity consisting of a 
set of positive and normative beliefs about ourselves that give us reasons to act.
Finally, Francisco León discusses Boudon’s well-known argument that psy-
chological or biological concepts should not play a role in the explanation of 
social phenomena given that – exactly as what happened with concepts such 
as “socialization” – these concepts reintroduce black boxes into explanations. 
Again, according to Boudon, in order to offer an explanation without black 
boxes, it is necessary is identify the reasons that drive individuals’ behaviour.
As León states, it now seems impossible to maintain that argument and the 
vast amount of evidence coming from the different behavioural sciences (neurosci-
ence, primatology, experimental economics, behavioural genetics, evolutionary 
psychology, etc.) in recent years cannot be ignored without further ado. Of course, 
accepting the role of “biological causes” does not entail that there are two kinds 
of phenomena, those that should be explained with reasons and those that should 
be explained with “biological causes”, nor (at least for the moment) that reasons 
should not play a key role in explanations. The question is rather, as Manzo also 
points out in his paper (referring specifically to fast and frugal heuristics), that both 
kinds of phenomena work in some kind of complex interrelation that is still to 
be unravelled. In conclusion, as León states, social science nowadays needs a new 
analytical turn: in the future, the explanatory strategy based on social mechanisms 
will have to be founded on contributions from the behavioural sciences.
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